

Turkey

Considering that an estimated 3 million Turkish nationals¹ are currently living in the European Union (EU), it seems logical to categorise Turkey, in terms of migration, as a major sending country. However, the Turkish Republic has been a major receiving country as well. From the Republic's very first day of existence, migration has served as an important tool in the process of nation building. The patterns of migration, however, have been changing constantly.

Temporary labour migration to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s turned into a process of family reunification, which ultimately resulted in the establishment of strong Turkish communities in the EU. After the period of official labour recruitment had been halted in the 1970s, new types of Turkish migrants – mainly Kurdish asylum seekers from the Republic's eastern provinces – began arriving in Western Europe during



Background information

Capital: Ankara

Official language: Turkish

Area: 783,562 km²

Population (2004): 70,556,000

Population density: 90 inhabitants per km²

Population growth (2000): 1.8%

Labour force participation rate (2004)²: 51.5%

Foreign-born population as a percentage of total (2004): 0.2%

Unemployment rate: 10.6% (2004); 10.8% (2003); 10.6% (2002) (OECD)

Religions (1999): 99% Muslim (80% Sunni and 20% Alevi or other Shiite); 1% non-Muslim (64% Armenian, 18% Jewish, 2.5% Greek Orthodox, 12% Syrian Orthodox, 3.3% Other)

the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout this process, Germany has remained a prime destination for Turkish emigrants.


In terms of immigration, Turkey has been confronted with a significant and constant influx of ethnic³ Turks from the territories of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire.⁴ While this "traditional" pattern of immigration has almost ceased over the last decade, new large scale movements have gained importance. These new migration flows comprise asylum seekers, refugees, irregular labour migrants and transit migrants on their way to the EU.

The issue of migration has a considerable impact on Turkish-EU relations. On the one hand, the governments of EU member states are concerned that if Turkey were to join the EU, there could be another major wave of Turkish labour migration. Such an influx would increase pressure on the national labour markets in member states. On the other hand, the EU wants Turkey to control its borders more effectively, in order to limit transit migration, and to deal with asylum seekers and refugees in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Knowing the issue's importance, the Turkish government is undertaking efforts to align Turkey's migration policies and laws with the requirements set out in European and international law.

Historical Background

In order to gain a better understanding of Turkish migration policies, it is necessary to have a brief look at the political developments which occurred immediately before and after the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923. Towards the end of Ottoman rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the rise of nationalist movements changed the demographic face of the once multi-ethnic and multi-religious region tremendously. Starting with the Greek war of independence (1821-29), the Ottoman Empire began to collapse. At the eve of the First World War, its European domains had been reduced to Eastern Thrace and Istanbul, the outermost southeastern corner of the continent. The nation-building processes in the Balkans and Anatolia were accompanied by several consecutive waves of forced migration and ethnic cleansing. Generally speaking, the rise of nationalism resulted in a long-term exodus of Muslim communities from the Balkans to Anatolia as well as an exodus of Christian communities in the other direction.

Major immigration movements from the Balkans to Turkey



Source: Zentrum für Türkeistudien. Turkey Yearbook 1998 & 1999/2000. Münster

The Balkan War of 1912/13, in which the Ottoman Empire was faced with a joint alliance of Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, forced some 800,000 Muslims from their homelands in the Balkans towards Anatolia.⁵ Since the existence of significant Muslim minority populations did not fit into the ideological concept of the newly founded nation states, the remaining Muslim minorities came under mounting political pressure to leave. Nevertheless, a considerable Muslim population stayed behind, particularly in Bulgaria, Bosnia and Greece.

Traumatized by the loss of nearly all of its European provinces, the Ottoman leadership began to adopt increasingly nationalist ideologies. In the context of this political climate, Anatolia was identified as the national heartland of a future Turkish state. From then on, the non-Muslim communities of Anatolia were regarded as a general threat to national security and were successively driven out over the years that followed.

In 1915/16, almost the entire Armenian population – with the exception of those residing in Istanbul – became the target of organised killings and mass deportations. Only months after the end of the First World War, in May 1919, Greek troops invaded western Anatolia, marking the initial stage of Turkey's liberation war. When the Greek army was defeated in September 1922, the large majority of Greek Orthodox Christians, an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 people,⁶ fled western Anatolia. The Greek Orthodox communities in central Anatolia and along the eastern Black Sea coast initially remained.

Even after the long period of war was over⁷ and the new Republic of Turkey had been internationally recognised in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923, migration movements between the Balkans and Anatolia continued. The Treaty of Lausanne included a joint agreement on a population exchange between Turkey and Greece, which led to the resettlement of an estimated 1.3 million ethnic Greeks from central Anatolia and the Black Sea region to Greece and some 400,000 to 500,000 ethnic Turks from Greece to Turkey.⁸ The criterion for classifying a person as Turkish or Greek was exclusively religious (i.e. Muslims were classified as Turks and Christians as

Greeks), although small Turkish-speaking Christian communities and Greek-speaking Muslim communities existed as well. Only the Greek-Orthodox population of Istanbul and the Muslim population of Western Thrace were excluded from the agreement.

Since the Balkan states were eager to remove the Muslim minorities from their territories, and since Turkey wished to compensate for tremendous wartime population losses, migration from the Balkans to Turkey was further encouraged. When Turkey signed a number of treaties of friendship with its Balkan neighbours (Bulgaria in 1925, Greece in 1930, Romania in 1936 and Yugoslavia in 1950), they always included provisions on migration. This resulted in the arrival of several major waves of Balkan immigrants in Turkey.⁹


Emigration

Turkey became involved in the post-Second World War European labour migration process when it signed a bilateral agreement on labour recruitment with the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1961. Further agreements were reached with Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1964, with France in 1965 and with Sweden in 1967. Faced with a rapidly growing population, the Turkish authorities encouraged the emigration of workers to Western Europe in order to ease pressure on the national labour market. Labour migrants were recruited and registered through the national Turkish Employment Service. The outflow of workers, small at first, gathered speed quickly and peaked in the early 1970s. By the end of 1973, the Turkish Employment Service had sent more than 780,000 workers to Western Europe, of which more than 80% went to Germany. In

1973/74, however, official labour recruitment stopped abruptly due to a change in policy that was brought about by the international oil crisis and its economic repercussions. Western European countries halted the recruitment of non-EC labour migrants, but mostly granted those already working and living in their territories permanent residence permits and the right to family reunification.

irregular labour migrants began to increase, and considerable refugee movements emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1980 military coup d'état and the outbreak of military conflict between Turkish security forces and the formerly separatist Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey's eastern, predominantly Kurdish provinces were responsible for the refugee movements. The main countries granting asylum to refugees from Turkey throughout this period were Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

Turkish citizens residing in Western Europe in 2003



Source: Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security

Once re-admission to Western European labour markets had become impossible, many Turkish nationals decided to stay in their host countries and opted to send for their families. This process of family reunification fundamentally changed the demographic pattern of migration; women and children joined the (mostly male) former 'guest workers,' and these families became permanent residents in Western European countries.


Despite the official stop in labour recruitment, migration flows from Turkey to Western Europe changed rather than ceased. This was partly due to the lasting process of family reunification. More significantly, however, the number of

During the time when official labour migration to Western Europe had ceased almost entirely, new labour markets, especially in the Middle East, started to gain in importance. In contrast to Western Europe, where female labour migration played a significant role in the early 1970s, labour migration to the Middle East – particularly Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait – was strictly limited to male workers who were to return home after their contracts expired.

One last aspect of emigration to be mentioned here is the exodus of Turkey's non-Muslim religious communities. Although Christians and Jews were granted minority

status and protection under the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, their numbers have been steadily declining due to emigration. After the Turkish National Liberation War and the Population Exchange Agreement with Greece, an estimated 100,000 Greeks still resided in Istanbul alone. However, tensions between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and acts of discrimination in daily life have provided grounds for further emigration. As a result, the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey currently comprises approximately 3,000-4,000 persons. The Armenian Orthodox community has been declining in a similar manner and now consists of an estimated 93,500 persons. The Jewish community, which has been affected by emigration to Israel and North America, has shrunk to approximately 26,000 persons.¹⁰

Asylum applicants from Turkey: main countries of asylum



Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2003

National Immigration Policy

Turkey's national immigration policy and the question of who is allowed to enter and/or stay in the country are closely tied to the Republic's notion of national identity and citizenship. Although the constitutional concept of citizenship emphasises territoriality (*ius soli*) rather than descent (*ius sanguinis*), the concept of national identity clearly relies on the perception of one common culture. In other words, Turkey's immigration policy – including regulations on refugees and asylum

– is still strongly guided by the concept of national identity and its underlying principle of cultural unity. This idea is clearly reflected in the three legal documents which form the basis of the country's current immigration policy:

- the 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 2510)
- the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees
- the 1994 Regulation on Asylum.

The importance of these laws will be explained in the following paragraphs with regard to aspects of citizenship, refuge and asylum.

Citizenship

The 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 2510) laid the foundations of Turkish immigration policy. It entitles persons of 'Turkish descent and culture' to enter the country for the purpose of permanent settlement and to opt for Turkish citizenship.

Actually, it is not mandatory to be of 'Turkish culture and descent' in order to acquire Turkish citizenship, although being of Turkish descent facilitates the acquisition procedure. Turkish citizenship laws put clear emphasis on the principle of territoriality (*ius soli*). This is due to the fact that the founding fathers of modern Turkey aspired to integrate the many different ethnic groups (Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Tatars, Azeri, etc.), which formed Turkish society from the very beginning, by granting citizenship to those born within its territory. Today foreign nationals are entitled to apply for Turkish citizenship on the basis of marriage, residence, birth and the intention to settle permanently.

The acquisition of Turkish citizenship by means of naturalisation requires five years of permanent residence in Turkey and the confirmed intention to settle in the country. Children born in Turkey to foreign nationals have the right to opt for Turkish citizenship within three years after reaching maturity. In principle, Turkish citizenship laws allow dual citizenship.¹¹

The recent adoption of EU legislative standards and the growing importance of Turkey as an immigration country have had a significant impact on the existing citizenship laws, particularly concerning the acquisition of citizenship upon marriage. According to previous provisions, a foreign woman who married a Turkish man was automatically entitled to acquire Turkish citizenship. Due to the increasing number of marriages of convenience, the provision has now become subject to a number of conditions. For example, foreign spouses are now eligible for naturalisation after three years of marriage. With reference to gender equality, the right to acquire citizenship by way of marriage is now granted to foreign men as well.

Minority rights

The Turkish Republic's notion of what constitutes a 'minority' is based on the Ottoman Empire's legal tradition, the so-called *millet* system. According to Islamic law, all non-Muslim communities were granted *millet* status (Turkish

for 'people' or 'nation'), which gave them a certain degree of autonomy (especially concerning religious affairs) and state protection. At the same time, these religious communities were subject to a number of (fiscal) obligations and were expected to show loyalty to the state. In accordance with this tradition, the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 granted minority status only to the 'old' Christian and Jewish communities. The minorities recognized by the Turkish authorities under the Treaty of Lausanne are the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox and the Jewish communities; newly emerging non-Muslim groups, such as Catholics and Protestants, have not been granted minority status.¹² Members of these communities are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and worship. Ethnic and religious Muslim minority groups such as Kurds, Laz and Alevis also lack minority status; they are legally safeguarded by the principle of equality and non-discrimination as laid down under the 1982 Turkish Constitution.¹³

Although the armed conflict with the PKK almost came to an end with the arrest of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, and with his public appeal to the guerrillas to lay down their weapons, the Kurdish issue remains heavily disputed in Turkey's domestic politics. Despite the de facto multi-ethnic character of its society, the Turkish concept of nation building has focused on the principle of cultural assimilation. This policy, which has resulted in wide-scale repressive action against the Kurdish language and Kurdish culture in the past, has been the target of reform processes in recent years. Use of the Kurdish language in public is no longer banned; Kurdish radio and television programmes and cultural events, such as concerts or literary performances, are permitted. However, such cultural endeavours usually lack the necessary support from private and state institutions.


A peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue seems to lie more in the strengthening of Turkish civil society than in the improvement of minority rights, which are often propagated from a European perspective. Even representatives of the PKK's political wing, the Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP, ex-DEHAP), have spoken out against a special minority status for the Kurdish population. Instead, they have pleaded for the recognition and equal treatment of Kurdish people on the basis of the crucial role they played in the war of independence and the creation of the Republic in 1923.

Meanwhile, Turkey is being confronted with a number of negative spill-over effects from war-torn Iraq. De facto Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq and international pressure on Turkey to recognise the Kurdish right to self-determination arouse nationalist fears of Kurdish separatism in the eastern provinces. These factors might endanger a political and peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue and affect international migration movements in the future.

Refuge and Asylum

Until Turkey adopted the Geneva Convention on Refugees on 30 March 1962, Law 2510 (see above) provided the only legal basis for regulating the issue of asylum. Even the adoption of the Geneva Convention was deeply influenced by the culturalist spirit of Law 2510. Turkey accepted the international obligations

Refugees and asylum-seekers in Turkey



Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2003

concerning asylum procedures, recognition and protection of refugees, but inserted a geographical limitation which restricted admission to refugees from Europe. Although Turkey still maintains this geographical limitation, it put into place a system for dealing with non-European asylum applicants in response to refugee movements from the Middle East and some parts of Africa.

Non-European refugees and asylum seekers

Beginning with a significant wave of Iranian refugees following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, migration from the Balkans has been increasingly replaced by large-scale refugee movements from the Middle East and some parts of Africa. The number of Iranians seeking temporary refuge in Turkey at that time is hard to determine exactly. Estimates range from 500,000 to 1.5 million. A second and third wave of refugees emerged in 1988 and 1991 respectively, this time from neighbouring Iraq. In August 1988, Turkey opened its borders to more than 50,000 Kurdish refugees after Iraqi troops had launched a massive offensive against Kurdish fighters in Northern Iraq. At the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War, approximately 60,000 foreign workers fled Iraq via Turkey. In April 1991, some 700,000 to 850,000 Kurds gathered at the Turkish-Iraqi borders seeking shelter from attacks by the Iraqi army. The majority of Kurdish refugees left Turkey soon after a special safety zone had been declared in Northern Iraq, or after they had been given the possibility to resettle in a third country.¹⁴ Smaller refugee groups have been arriving from countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan since the early 1990s.

Turkey responded to the large influxes of non-European refugees in the 1980s and early 1990s by adopting the 1994 Regulation on Asylum. Unlike preceding legislative measures, the new regulation was aimed explicitly at non-European refugees and asylum seekers. But instead of abolishing the geographical limitation, it cemented the system of differential treatment for European and non-European refugees.

The 1994 regulation imposed a number of preconditions

for filing asylum applications. In practice this means that asylum seekers have to register with the Turkish authorities within 10 days of entering the country and provide valid identification documents within 15 days. After submitting a petition for asylum, non-European asylum seekers are transferred to UNHCR's mandate in Turkey. UNHCR then takes on the task of status determination. For those granted official refugee status, UNHCR seeks resettlement to third countries. Currently, the main countries of destination for non-European refugees in Turkey are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Non-European refugees are not given the possibility to stay in Turkey permanently or integrate into Turkish society.


The majority of asylum seekers are faced with poor economic and social conditions. During the process of final status determination, which usually takes several years, they do not have access to government assistance, public welfare, education or the labour market. The lack of state protection forces the majority into an irregular existence in the big cities and makes them vulnerable to exploitation by employers, landlords and police. Some assistance – including health care, legal advice, education, etc. – is provided by UNHCR, Turkey's emerging civil society and a number of international NGOs.

Foreign Population

The share of foreigners living in Turkey on the basis of temporary residence permits lies well below 0.5% of the country's total population. In August 2004, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior placed the number of foreigners living in Turkey at 139,284, or 0.2% of the total population. This figure did not include foreign nationals of countries with less than 400 citizens residing in Turkey. Nor did it include those who avoid the (expensive) procedure of applying for a residence permit by leaving and re-entering the country every three months in order to renew their tourist visas.

Other statistical sources shed a different light on the number of foreigners living in the country. For example, according to the census conducted in 2000, approximately 1,279,000 persons living in Turkey were born abroad, which amounted to 1.9% of the total population of 67,804,000. The largest groups among the foreign-born in that year were Bulgarian-born (481,000) and German-born (274,000) ethnic Turks. In 2002-2003 the OECD placed the number of foreign-born persons at 1,256,000, of which 262,000 were identified as foreign nationals.

Country of origin of foreigners in Turkey in 2004 (total 139,284)



Source: Turkish Ministry of the Interior, August 2004

Irregular Migration

Turkey's geographical position as a country with 7,200 kilometres of coastline that borders eight other states, combined with its relatively lax visa policy, makes it a major destination and transit country for irregular migration flows. Irregular migration movements in Turkey comprise three overlapping types of migrants: refugees and asylum seekers, transit migrants and clandestine labourers. Well-organized human smuggling and trafficking networks also play a role in sustaining irregular migration.

As irregular migrants are – by definition – impossible to capture accurately in official statistical data, it is hard to discern the magnitude of the phenomenon. According to official statistics on the number of apprehensions per year at the Turkish border over the last decade, the number of irregular migrants apprehended increased steadily and peaked in 2000 at 94,514, remaining at a high level in 2001 and 2002 before declining. In 2004, 61,228 irregular migrants were apprehended.¹⁵ In that year, the main countries of origin for those apprehended were Pakistan, Iraq, Moldova, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mauritania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Iran. While these figures may help in estimating the number of irregular migrants entering Turkey each year, it is unclear how many avoid apprehension. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), for example, has estimated that there are 200,000 transit migrants alone each year.¹⁶

A migrant may be authorised to enter the country but become 'irregular' by residing there and/or working without the necessary permit. One report produced for the IOM in 2003 points to the fact that thousands of migrants from the Balkans and the countries of the former USSR who have entered the country under Turkey's liberal tourist visa policy have stayed on as irregular residents and/or workers.¹⁷

Human smuggling and trafficking

Turkey has made some significant legislative changes in an effort to combat human smuggling and trafficking. First, it has

amended its penal code to reflect the UN's Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) and its two protocols related to human smuggling and trafficking. Migrant smugglers now face penalties of three to eight years' imprisonment and a judicial fine, a penalty that increases by half if the perpetrators are acting as an organisation. The new penal code also provides an official definition of trafficking and a punishment of eight to ten years' imprisonment and judicial fine for the offense. The Ministry of Health has ordered the provision of free medical treatment at state-owned hospitals for individuals who have been identified as victims of human trafficking. Additionally, the Ministry

of the Interior now allows authorities to issue humanitarian visas and temporary residence permits for up to 6 months to those victims of human trafficking who wish to stay in Turkey for rehabilitation and treatment.¹⁸

The Issue of Migration in Light of EU-Turkish Relations

The issue of migration has become central to EU-Turkish relations.¹⁹ Particularly in the run-up to the EU membership negotiations, which were formally opened on 3 October 2005, Turkey came under increasing pressure to reform its legislative system and control irregular migration flows. Three main issues need to be addressed by the Turkish government during the accession process:

- developing asylum legislation
- signing readmission agreements with third countries
- lifting the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention

Developing national asylum legislation that reflects international standards will involve taking legal as well as practical measures, such as establishing reception centres, creating protection mechanisms and developing a national integration programme. In light of the EU accession process, major reform efforts have been underway in Turkey, with a National Programme for Accession being introduced by the Turkish parliament in March 2001. This programme outlines measures that need to be taken in order to meet the so-called Copenhagen criteria for EU membership and to bring national legislation in line with the *acquis communautaire*.²⁰ In this context, the Turkish authorities have implemented a number of measures aimed at reforming the country's migration and asylum policies:²¹

- In order to align its visa policy with that of the EU, Turkey introduced visa requirements for a number of states, including

Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman in 2001 and 2002. Visa requirements for an additional 13 countries were to have been introduced by the end of 2005. This procedure marks the step-by-step abrogation of Turkey's previously liberal visa policy towards countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.

- In March 2003, Turkey ratified the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners (No. 4817), annulling Law No. 2007 of 1932. Under the new law, foreign citizens are now allowed to work as interpreters, guides, photographers, drivers and waiters, as well as in other jobs that used to be open to Turkish citizens only.
- With regard to combating irregular migration, Turkey has reinforced its legislative framework by amending its national criminal code and ratifying the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.
- Turkey has adopted a number of directives and standards concerning the issues of family reunification and residence rights for third country nationals.
- The Turkish government has begun negotiating readmission agreements with third countries. Agreements with Syria, Greece, Kyrgyzstan and Romania have already been signed.

A recommendation to lift the geographic limitation on the status of refugees is likely to be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in 2012. The government has also agreed to further intensify cooperation with UNHCR on the procedure of refugee status determination.

Future Challenges

Meeting EU requirements in immigration, asylum and irregular migration will place significant demands on Turkey's financial resources and institutional capacities. The management of external borders in particular will need to be improved before Turkey is able to adopt the Schengen *acquis*, which entails the elimination of internal EU borders, and which would give the country greater responsibility for (EU) border management. Although the EU will provide some financial and technical support, concerns remain about the difficulties Turkey could face if, following such costly and extensive changes, it is not admitted to the EU.

If Turkey meets the three major EU requirements in the area of migration and asylum prior to accession (i.e. if it develops its asylum legislation, signs readmission agreements with third countries and lifts the geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention), it will qualify as a safe third country for asylum seekers. As a result, migrants who arrive in the EU via Turkey could easily be sent back to Turkey in order to apply for asylum there. This has raised concerns that Turkey may become responsible for a disproportionate number of asylum applicants.

In the long run, the changes in asylum policy and membership in the EU could transform Turkey from a country of transit migration to a destination country for international migrants. This would represent a significant challenge to the traditional notion that immigration to Turkey should be

exclusively limited to people of Turkish descent and culture.

During the Austrian and Finnish EU presidencies in 2006,²² the EU intends to place emphasis on developing a common EU policy on asylum, migration and border controls. Priority will be given to addressing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings. Continued efforts on the part of Turkey to align its national legislation with the *acquis* on migration and asylum may well represent an important step towards fulfilling its goal of full EU membership.²³ By the same token, Turkey's willingness to make these efforts may well depend on whether it considers the accession negotiations to be proceeding in a positive fashion.

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Endnotes

- ¹ The Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security placed the number of Turkish passport holders in the EU (not including Ireland and Portugal) at 3,038,215 in December 2003. As pointed out in Fargues (2005), there are some concerns about the reliability of Turkish emigration data. This is also the case with statistics from receiving countries in the EU. These statistics often rely on different definitions, counting foreign nationals, persons born abroad, or a combination of both.
- ² The labour force participation rate is defined as the proportion of persons between the ages of 15-64 available for work (both those currently in work and those currently unemployed).
- ³ The term "ethnic Turk" refers here to all Muslims from the former Ottoman Empire's European territories. Within the context of this article, "ethnicity" is not taken to be an objective category that denotes belonging to a group of persons of common descent or language. Rather, individuals are considered as "ethnic Turks" according to a particular national ideology which is codified in law.
- ⁴ At the peak of its power in the late seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire stretched over three continents. Its domains covered the North African coast (excluding solely Morocco); the Mediterranean Islands of Rhodes, Crete and Cyprus; all of Asia Minor, the Levant and Mesopotamia; the western coast of the Arabian Peninsula (temporarily including Yemen); almost the entire Black Sea region; parts of the Caucasus; and the Balkans, including today's states of Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria.
- ⁵ Source: Zentrum für Türkeistudien. *Türkei-Jahrbuch des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 1999/2000*. Münster.
- ⁶ According to Zürcher (2003).
- ⁷ The Balkan War of 1912/13 was followed closely by the First World War (1914-1918) and the War of Liberation (1919-1922).
- ⁸ Source: Zentrum für Türkeistudien. *Türkei-Jahrbuch des Zentrums für Türkeistudien 1998 & 1999/2000*. Münster.
- ⁹ It is important to note that many of those entering Turkey as refugees returned to their countries of origin shortly after the political situations there had calmed down. This applies to the most recent influxes from Bulgaria and Bosnia in particular.
- ¹⁰ These numbers are based on estimations by the United Nations. See United Nations (2000).

¹¹ According to Çiçekli (2005).

¹² The Armenian Protestant and Catholic churches are exceptions, because they were seen as a part of the Armenian community.

¹³ The principles of equality, non-discrimination and freedom of religious belief for all citizens are laid down in articles 10, 14, and 24 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution.

¹⁴ All data appearing in this paragraph on the number of refugees are taken from Franz (1994).

¹⁵ Sources: Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior; Futo and Jandl (2005).

¹⁶ See İçduygu (2003).

¹⁷ See İçduygu (2003).

¹⁸ See Futo and Jandl (2005).

¹⁹ For a comprehensive timeline of key events in EU-Turkey relations see the European Commission's (DG Enlargement) website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/key_events.htm.

²⁰ The term *acquis communautaire* refers to the entire body of legislation of the European Communities and Union, which applicant countries must implement before joining the EU. See the glossary of terms on the website of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security: http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/glossary/glossary_a_en.htm.

²¹ See Council of Europe (2005) and European Commission (2005).

²² See Council of the European Union (2005).

²³ For more information on the EU's negotiating framework for Turkey see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf

Statistical sources

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- Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Turkey (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı): <http://www.calisma.gov.tr>
- Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu): <http://www.tuik.gov.tr> (formerly Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü: <http://www.die.gov.tr>)
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- Centre for Migration Research, Istanbul Bilgi University (Göç Çalışmaları Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi, Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi): <http://goc.bilgi.edu.tr>
- Helsinki Citizens Assembly (Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği), Refugee Legal Aid Program: <http://www.hyd.org.tr>
- Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington, D.C.: <http://www.migrationinformation.org>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=tur> ; <http://www.unhcr.org.tr/>
- US Committee for Refugees, Country Report Turkey 2005: <http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=1336>

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